论文标题
公共物品游戏的反向形式：等价和差异
A reversed form of public goods game: equivalence and difference
论文作者
论文摘要
根据公共物品游戏（PGG）协议，参与者自由决定是否想为普通池做出贡献，但是由此产生的收益是平等分配的。当参与者考虑是否声称共同资源，但所有小组成员同样涵盖相关费用时，可能会出现概念上类似的困境情况。后者建立了原始公共物品游戏（R-PGG）的相反形式。在这项工作中，我们表明，从传统分析开始，通过非结构化人群的进化方法，R-PGG等于PGG，再到结构化人群中的蒙特卡洛模拟。但是，在某些情况下，R-PGG的行为可能与PGG的结果有所不同。例如，当关键参数是异质的时，即使我们应用了相同的异质性振幅，PGG和R-PGG的结果也可能是多样化的。我们发现R-PGG的异质性通常阻碍了合作，而PGG的异质性则相反。如果我们遵循在参数空间中引入异质性时的收益功能如何变化，则可以理解这些不同的系统反应。该分析还揭示了合作者和叛逃者策略在上述游戏中的不同作用。我们的观察结果可能有望刺激进一步的研究，以检查由于条件的替代复杂性，因此可以检查PGG和R-PGG之间的潜在差异。
According to the public goods game (PGG) protocol, participants decide freely whether they want to contribute to a common pool or not, but the resulting benefit is distributed equally. A conceptually similar dilemma situation may emerge when participants consider if they claim a common resource but the related cost is covered equally by all group members. The latter establishes a reversed form of the original public goods game (R-PGG). In this work, we show that R-PGG is equivalent to PGG in several circumstances, starting from the traditional analysis, via the evolutionary approach in unstructured populations, to Monte Carlo simulations in structured populations. However, there are also cases when the behavior of R-PGG could be surprisingly different from the outcome of PGG. When the key parameters are heterogeneous, for instance, the results of PGG and R-PGG could be diverse even if we apply the same amplitudes of heterogeneity. We find that the heterogeneity in R-PGG generally impedes cooperation, while the opposite is observed for PGG. These diverse system reactions can be understood if we follow how payoff functions change when introducing heterogeneity in the parameter space. This analysis also reveals the distinct roles of cooperator and defector strategies in the mentioned games. Our observations may hopefully stimulate further research to check the potential differences between PGG and R-PGG due to the alternative complexity of conditions.
