论文标题
COVID-BIT：与我的气隙计算机保持距离（至少为2m）！
COVID-bit: Keep a Distance of (at least) 2m From My Air-Gap Computer!
论文作者
论文摘要
由于他们处理的敏感信息，因此从互联网中隔离了空调系统。本文介绍了Covid-Bit，这是一种新的Covert通道攻击，可从高度孤立的系统中泄漏空气中的敏感信息。这些信息从空气上的气动计算机散发到2m及更多的距离，可以被附近的内部人员或使用手机或笔记本电脑的间谍捡起。空调计算机上的恶意软件可以通过在目标系统上执行制作的代码来产生无线电波。恶意代码利用了现代计算机的动态功耗，并操纵CPU内核上的瞬时负载。该技术使恶意软件能够控制计算机的内部利用率，并在0-60 kHz频段中产生低频电磁辐射。敏感信息（例如，文件，加密密钥，生物识别数据和键盘记录）可以在发射的信号上调制，并以附近的手机的最大速度为1000位/秒收到。我们表明，具有恶意内部人或访客携带的小\ $ 1天线的智能手机或笔记本电脑可以用作秘密接收器。值得注意的是，该攻击是高度回避的，因为它从普通的用户级过程中执行，不需要根特权，即使在虚拟机（VM）中也是有效的。我们讨论攻击模型并提供技术细节。我们实施文本和文件的气隙传输，以及当前的信号生成和数据调制。我们测试秘密渠道并显示评估结果。最后，我们为这种气隙攻击提供了一组对策。
Air-gapped systems are isolated from the Internet due to the sensitive information they handle. This paper presents COVID-bit, a new COVert channel attack that leaks sensitive information over the air from highly isolated systems. The information emanates from the air-gapped computer over the air to a distance of 2m and more and can be picked up by a nearby insider or spy with a mobile phone or laptop. Malware on an air-gapped computer can generate radio waves by executing crafted code on the target system. The malicious code exploits the dynamic power consumption of modern computers and manipulates the momentary loads on CPU cores. This technique allows the malware to control the computer's internal utilization and generate low-frequency electromagnetic radiation in the 0 - 60 kHz band. Sensitive information (e.g., files, encryption keys, biometric data, and keylogging) can be modulated over the emanated signals and received by a nearby mobile phone at a max speed of 1000 bits/sec. We show that a smartphone or laptop with a small \$1 antenna carried by a malicious insider or visitor can be used as a covert receiver. Notably, the attack is highly evasive since it executes from an ordinary user-level process, does not require root privileges, and is effective even within a Virtual Machine (VM). We discuss the attack model and provide technical details. We implement air-gap transmission of texts and files, and present signal generation and data modulation. We test the covert channel and show evaluation results. Finally, we present a set of countermeasures to this air-gap attack.
