论文标题
物理层安全可以为6G安全性做什么
What Physical Layer Security Can Do for 6G Security
论文作者
论文摘要
尽管现有的安全协议的设计侧重于核心网络,但B5G访问网络的安全性的增强变得至关重要。尽管在LTE方面加强了5G安全协议,但仍有未充分解决的开放问题。这项工作是围绕从物理层开始重新考虑安全设计的前提的前提,不仅在6G中可行,而且重要的是,它是克服新型用例中的安全障碍的一种有效方法,尤其是巨大的机器类型通信(MMTC),超可靠的低延迟通信(URLLC)和自动cyberphyssical Systems。与现有的评论论文对物理层的正交处理对密码学的处理,我们将尝试提供一些基本连接的见解。在讨论许多实际问题时,我们将对i)秘密关键一代的全面审查,ii)秘密关键一代,ii)窃听通道和基本限制,iii)使用物理不可吻合功能(PUFS)对设备进行身份验证,本地化和多物质身份验证,以及在物理层处于jamm的攻击。我们终于以提议者对6G安全格局的愿望,在超连接性和语义通信时代。
While existing security protocols were designed with a focus on the core network, the enhancement of the security of the B5G access network becomes of critical importance. Despite the strengthening of 5G security protocols with respect to LTE, there are still open issues that have not been fully addressed. This work is articulated around the premise that rethinking the security design bottom up, starting at the physical layer, is not only viable in 6G but importantly, arises as an efficient way to overcome security hurdles in novel use cases, notably massive machine type communications (mMTC), ultra reliable low latency communications (URLLC) and autonomous cyberphysical systems. Unlike existing review papers that treat physical layer security orthogonally to cryptography, we will try to provide a few insights of underlying connections. Discussing many practical issues, we will present a comprehensive review of the state-of-the-art in i) secret key generation from shared randomness, ii) the wiretap channel and fundamental limits, iii) authentication of devices using physical unclonable functions (PUFs), localization and multi-factor authentication, and, iv) jamming attacks at the physical layer. We finally conclude with the proposers' aspirations for the 6G security landscape, in the hyper-connectivity and semantic communications era.