论文标题
重复可选游戏中的进化动力
Evolutionary dynamics in repeated optional games
论文作者
论文摘要
当个人反复互动时，直接互惠促进了合作的演变。关于直接互惠的大多数研究都隐含地假设强制性相互作用。然而，在人类社会中，互动通常是自愿的。在这里，我们考虑重复的可选游戏，个人可以自由选择退出每次互动并稍后重新加入。我们发现，即使在重复的强制性游戏和一次性可选游戏中，自愿参与也可以极大地促进反复互动中的合作，即此外，我们从理论上表征了支持反应性策略之间合作的所有NASH均衡，并确定了三种新颖的策略，这些策略是错误的，很容易成为平衡，并在进化动力学中占主导地位。这些策略的成功取决于选择退出的影响：它不仅避免了陷入相互叛逃的陷阱，而且对故意缺陷构成了额外的威胁。我们的工作强调，自愿参与是增强重复互动中合作的简单有效机制。
Direct reciprocity facilitates the evolution of cooperation when individuals interact repeatedly. Most previous studies on direct reciprocity implicitly assume compulsory interactions. Yet, interactions are often voluntary in human societies. Here, we consider repeated optional games, where individuals can freely opt out of each interaction and rejoin later. We find that voluntary participation greatly promotes cooperation in repeated interactions, even in harsh situations where repeated compulsory games and one-shot optional games yield low cooperation rates. Moreover, we theoretically characterize all Nash equilibria that support cooperation among reactive strategies, and identify three novel classes of strategies that are error-robust, readily become equilibria, and dominate in the evolutionary dynamics. The success of these strategies hinges on the effect of opt-out: it not only avoids trapping in mutual defection but also poses additional threats to intentional defectors. Our work highlights that voluntary participation is a simple and effective mechanism to enhance cooperation in repeated interactions.
