论文标题
有效的公用事业游戏，具有信息共享约束
Valid Utility Games with Information Sharing Constraints
论文作者
论文摘要
在多种系统中，将游戏理论方法用于控制是最近研究的重要主题。特别是有效的公用事业游戏已被用来建模现实世界中的问题。这样的游戏具有便捷的属性，即任何决策集的价值是游戏的NASH均衡，保证在最佳决策集值的价值的1/2之内。但是，此保证中的一个隐含假设是，每个代理都知道所有其他代理的决定。在这项工作中，我们首先描述了这种保证如何降低，因为代理只知道其他代理人的决定的一部分。然后，我们证明，可以通过限制到相关的游戏子类来减轻这种损失。
The use of game theoretic methods for control in multiagent systems has been an important topic in recent research. Valid utility games in particular have been used to model real-world problems; such games have the convenient property that the value of any decision set which is a Nash equilibrium of the game is guaranteed to be within 1/2 of the value of the optimal decision set. However, an implicit assumption in this guarantee is that each agent is aware of the decisions of all other agents. In this work, we first describe how this guarantee degrades as agents are only aware of a subset of the decisions of other agents. We then show that this loss can be mitigated by restriction to a relevant subclass of games.
