论文标题
经济工会的动态：一种基于代理的模型，用于调查撤离的经济和社会驱动力
Dynamics of economic unions: an agent-based model to investigate the economic and social drivers of withdrawals
论文作者
论文摘要
经济工会是以国际协议为导向的，旨在提高经济效率并建立成员国之间的政治和文化联系。成为现有工会的成员通常需要同时批准候选人和成员，而离开它可能只需要离开国家的单方面意愿。有许多例子是将各州加入以前的合并经济工会，而最近离开的例子是英国退出欧盟。在英国脱欧过程中，在本文中，我们提出了一个基于代理的模型，以研究推动从经济联盟退出的决定因素。我们表明，工会和地方税都会促进出口，而从工会提高了海关费用。此外，业务条件和财富分配的异质性都会促进撤离，而国家的规模多样性对它们没有重大影响。我们还深入探讨了导致不满并最终退出的个人原因。我们发现，对于低工会税，该国内部的财富不平等是反工会意见传播的主要原因。相反，对于高工会税，该国的绩效被证明是主要的驱动力，导致富裕国家离开联盟的风险。这些发现将有助于设计经济政策和有效的信息活动。
Economic unions are international agreements oriented to increase economic efficiency and establishing political and cultural ties between the member countries. Becoming a member of an existing union usually requires the approval of both the candidate and members, while leaving it may require only the unilateral will of the exiting country. There are many examples of accession of states to previously consolidated economic unions, and a recent example of leaving is the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union. Motivated by the Brexit process, in this paper we propose an agent-based model to study the determinant factors driving withdrawals from an economic union. We show that both Union and local taxes promote the exits, whereas customs fees out of the Union boost cohesion. Furthermore, heterogeneity in both business conditions and wealth distribution promotes withdrawals, while countries' size diversity does not have a significant effect on them. We also deep into the individual causes that lead to dissatisfaction and, ultimately, to exits. We found that, for low Union taxes, the wealth inequality within the country is the leading cause of anti-Union opinion spreading. Conversely, for high Union taxes, the country's performance turns out to be the main driving force, resulting in a risk of wealthier countries leaving the Union. These findings will be helpful for the design of economic policies and effective informative campaigns.
