论文标题
根据评分规则，战略投票的福利影响
Welfare effects of strategic voting under scoring rules
论文作者
论文摘要
战略投票或操纵是选民歪曲他的偏好的过程，以选举结果，他认为他认为在真诚投票下比结果更可取的结果。人们普遍认为，操纵是选举的负面特征，并且花了很多努力来衡量投票规则操纵的脆弱性。但是，为什么实际上是不好的问题的问题是不太常见的。衡量操纵对结果的影响的一种方法是将真诚行为下的社会福利的数字衡量与在机械人的存在下进行比较。在本文中，我们进行了数字实验，以评估在评分规则下对社会福利的影响。我们发现操纵通常是负面的，在大多数情况下，操纵器的最佳规则与真诚的选民不同。
Strategic voting, or manipulation, is the process by which a voter misrepresents his preferences in an attempt to elect an outcome that he considers preferable to the outcome under sincere voting. It is generally agreed that manipulation is a negative feature of elections, and much effort has been spent on gauging the vulnerability of voting rules to manipulation. However, the question of why manipulation is actually bad is less commonly asked. One way to measure the effect of manipulation on an outcome is by comparing a numeric measure of social welfare under sincere behaviour to that in the presence of a manipulator. In this paper we conduct numeric experiments to assess the effects of manipulation on social welfare under scoring rules. We find that manipulation is usually negative, and in most cases the optimum rule with a manipulator is different to the one with sincere voters.
