论文标题
具有战略不确定性的第一价格拍卖的平衡模型：理论与经验
An Equilibrium Model of the First-Price Auction with Strategic Uncertainty: Theory and Empirics
论文作者
论文摘要
在许多一流的拍卖中，投标人面临着相当大的战略不确定性：他们无法完美地预测其他投标人的竞标行为。我们提出了一个模型，在这种模型中，投标人不知道对手投标的整个分布，而只知道对手竞标的预期（获胜）出价以及下限和上限。我们表征了最佳的招标策略，并证明了平衡信念的存在。最后，我们应用该模型来估计高速公路采购拍卖中的成本分布，并在样本外找到良好的性能。
In many first-price auctions, bidders face considerable strategic uncertainty: They cannot perfectly anticipate the other bidders' bidding behavior. We propose a model in which bidders do not know the entire distribution of opponent bids but only the expected (winning) bid and lower and upper bounds on the opponent bids. We characterize the optimal bidding strategies and prove the existence of equilibrium beliefs. Finally, we apply the model to estimate the cost distribution in highway procurement auctions and find good performance out-of-sample.
