论文标题
多区政党选举中的扰流板易感性
Spoiler Susceptibility in Multi-District Party Elections
论文作者
论文摘要
选举破坏者是这样的代理人，有一个代理商的联盟，当被假定的剧透被消除时，其全部收益超过了扰流板在选举结果中的份额。到目前为止，扰流板的影响主要在单打选举系统的背景下进行了分析。我们在多区政党选举的背景下考虑这个问题。我们介绍了一个正式的衡量一方的选举影响，将“破坏者”视为一种学位。这种方法使我们能够根据多获奖者的社会选择规则，根据其剧透敏感性程度。我们为七个经典规则（$ k $ -borda，Chamberlan-库兰，谐波，jefferson--d'hondt，PAV，SNTV和STV）提出了玩具模型的实验结果以及玩具模型的分析结果。由于已经开发了用于非党派选举的计算社会选择中常用的概率模型，因此我们将其扩展到能够产生多区政党选举。
Electoral spoilers are such agents that there exists a coalition of agents whose total gain when a putative spoiler is eliminated exceeds that spoiler's share in the election outcome. So far spoiler effects have been analyzed primarily in the context of single-winner electoral systems. We consider this problem in the context of multi-district party elections. We introduce a formal measure of a party's excess electoral impact, treating "spoilership" as a manner of degree. This approach allows us to compare multi-winner social choice rules according to their degree of spoiler susceptibility. We present experimental results, as well as analytical results for toy models, for seven classical rules ($k$-Borda, Chamberlin--Courant, Harmonic-Borda, Jefferson--D'Hondt, PAV, SNTV, and STV). Since the probabilistic models commonly used in computational social choice have been developed for non-party elections, we extend them to be able to generate multi-district party elections.
