论文标题
光可以破解你的脸!黑盒后门攻击面部识别系统
Light Can Hack Your Face! Black-box Backdoor Attack on Face Recognition Systems
论文作者
论文摘要
深度神经网络(DNN)在许多计算机视觉应用中都取得了巨大成功。但是,众所周知,它们容易受到后门攻击的影响。在进行后门攻击时,大多数现有方法都假定目标DNN始终可用,并且攻击者可以始终向训练数据注入特定模式,以进一步微调DNN模型。但是,实际上,由于DNN模型已加密,并且仅适用于安全飞地,因此这种攻击可能是不可行的。 在本文中,我们在面部识别系统上提出了一种新颖的黑盒后门攻击技术,可以在不了解目标DNN模型的情况下进行。具体来说,我们提出了带有新型颜色条纹图案触发的后门攻击,可以通过在专门的波形中调节LED来生成。我们还使用进化计算策略来优化波形用于后门攻击。我们的后门攻击可以在非常温和的情况下进行:1)对手不能以不自然的方式操纵输入(例如,注射对抗性噪声); 2)对手无法访问培训数据库; 3)对手不知道训练模型以及受害方使用的培训集。 我们表明,基于我们的仿真研究,根据我们的物理障碍研究,根据我们的仿真研究,攻击成功率可以高达$ 88 \%$ $ $ 40 \%$,通过考虑面部识别和验证的任务,根据我们在身份验证期间的大多数三次尝试,攻击成功率最高为40 \%$。最后,我们评估了几种针对后门攻击的最先进的潜在防御能力,并发现我们的攻击仍然可以有效。我们强调,我们的研究揭示了一种新的物理后门攻击,该攻击要求人们注意现有面部识别/验证技术的安全问题。
Deep neural networks (DNN) have shown great success in many computer vision applications. However, they are also known to be susceptible to backdoor attacks. When conducting backdoor attacks, most of the existing approaches assume that the targeted DNN is always available, and an attacker can always inject a specific pattern to the training data to further fine-tune the DNN model. However, in practice, such attack may not be feasible as the DNN model is encrypted and only available to the secure enclave. In this paper, we propose a novel black-box backdoor attack technique on face recognition systems, which can be conducted without the knowledge of the targeted DNN model. To be specific, we propose a backdoor attack with a novel color stripe pattern trigger, which can be generated by modulating LED in a specialized waveform. We also use an evolutionary computing strategy to optimize the waveform for backdoor attack. Our backdoor attack can be conducted in a very mild condition: 1) the adversary cannot manipulate the input in an unnatural way (e.g., injecting adversarial noise); 2) the adversary cannot access the training database; 3) the adversary has no knowledge of the training model as well as the training set used by the victim party. We show that the backdoor trigger can be quite effective, where the attack success rate can be up to $88\%$ based on our simulation study and up to $40\%$ based on our physical-domain study by considering the task of face recognition and verification based on at most three-time attempts during authentication. Finally, we evaluate several state-of-the-art potential defenses towards backdoor attacks, and find that our attack can still be effective. We highlight that our study revealed a new physical backdoor attack, which calls for the attention of the security issue of the existing face recognition/verification techniques.