论文标题
在对抗攻击下对LQG控制的游戏理论分析
A Game Theoretic Analysis of LQG Control under Adversarial Attack
论文作者
论文摘要
在本文中研究了最近针对深入增强学习的对抗性攻击的最近著作，对线性二次高斯控制进行了欺骗攻击。在考虑的攻击模型中，对手可以操纵受互助限制的代理的观察。对抗性问题被提出为一种新型的动态廉价谈话游戏，以捕获对手和代理之间的战略互动，信息可用性的不对称性以及系统动态。为纯粹的策略和行为策略中存在的次级完美平衡提供了必要和足够的条件；给出了平衡的特征和由此产生的控制奖励。结果表明，纯粹的策略平衡是有益的，而行为策略中只有babling平衡。显示数值结果可说明战略对抗相互作用的影响。
Motivated by recent works addressing adversarial attacks on deep reinforcement learning, a deception attack on linear quadratic Gaussian control is studied in this paper. In the considered attack model, the adversary can manipulate the observation of the agent subject to a mutual information constraint. The adversarial problem is formulated as a novel dynamic cheap talk game to capture the strategic interaction between the adversary and the agent, the asymmetry of information availability, and the system dynamics. Necessary and sufficient conditions are provided for subgame perfect equilibria to exist in pure strategies and in behavioral strategies; and characteristics of the equilibria and the resulting control rewards are given. The results show that pure strategy equilibria are informative, while only babbling equilibria exist in behavioral strategies. Numerical results are shown to illustrate the impact of strategic adversarial interaction.
