论文标题
在竞争环境中搜索移动目标
Search for a moving target in a competitive environment
论文作者
论文摘要
我们考虑了一个离散的动态搜索游戏，其中许多玩家竞争寻找一个看不见的对象，该对象正在根据时变的马尔可夫链移动。我们检查了这些游戏的次级完美平衡。本文的主要结果是，子游戏的一组完美平衡正是贪婪的策略概况集，即玩家始终选择一个动作的策略概况，以最大程度地提高他们立即找到对象的可能性。我们讨论模型的各种变化和扩展。
We consider a discrete-time dynamic search game in which a number of players compete to find an invisible object that is moving according to a time-varying Markov chain. We examine the subgame perfect equilibria of these games. The main result of the paper is that the set of subgame perfect equilibria is exactly the set of greedy strategy profiles, i.e. those strategy profiles in which the players always choose an action that maximizes their probability of immediately finding the object. We discuss various variations and extensions of the model.
