论文标题
激励措施和分配机制的效率
Incentives and Efficiency in Constrained Allocation Mechanisms
论文作者
论文摘要
我们在一般限制下研究私人善良分配。一些突出的例子是特殊案例，包括房屋分配，室友匹配，社交选择和多重任务。每种防策略和帕累托有效的两种代理机制都是“适应当地的独裁政权”。每个防止策略的N-代理机制都有两种机构的边际机制，这些机制是适应当地独裁统治的。这些结果产生了新的特征和统一的见解，以实现已知特征。我们为室友问题找到了所有防止策略和帕累托的高效机制。我们给出了多个分配的相关结果。我们证明了Gibbard-简历定理，并给出了部分相反。
We study private-good allocation under general constraints. Several prominent examples are special cases, including house allocation, roommate matching, social choice, and multiple assignment. Every individually strategy-proof and Pareto efficient two-agent mechanism is an "adapted local dictatorship." Every group strategy-proof N-agent mechanism has two-agent marginal mechanisms that are adapted local dictatorships. These results yield new characterizations and unifying insights for known characterizations. We find all group strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanisms for the roommates problem. We give a related result for multiple assignment. We prove the Gibbard--Satterthwaite Theorem and give a partial converse.
