论文标题
社会福利和无政府状态的优先优先级排队
Social Welfare and Price of Anarchy in Preemptive Priority Queues
论文作者
论文摘要
考虑一个不可观察的$ m | g | 1 $队列，并带有预先清点调度和两个优先类。客户是战略性的，可以收费加入高级课程。我们分析了所得的平衡结果，均衡稳定性和社会福利。我们发现，对于具有大于1的变化系数的服务分布，在低负载下存在独特而稳定的混合平衡。我们还对无政府状态的价格建立了紧密的限制，即$ 4/3 $。
Consider an unobservable $M|G|1$ queue with preemptive-resume scheduling and two priority classes. Customers are strategic and may join the premium class for a fee. We analyze the resulting equilibrium outcomes, equilibrium stability, and social welfare. We find that for service distributions with coefficient of variation greater than 1, there exists a unique and stable mixed equilibrium at low loads. We also establish a tight bound on the price of anarchy, which is $4/3$.
