论文标题
展示您的手回报时：在上校游戏中宣布战略意图
When showing your hand pays off: Announcing strategic intentions in Colonel Blotto games
论文作者
论文摘要
在竞争性的对抗环境中，混淆自己的策略或能力通常是有利的。但是，揭示一个人的战略意图可能会以复杂的方式改变竞争的动态。向对手揭示战略意图是有利的吗？在本文中，我们考虑了三阶段的上校障碍游戏，其中一个玩家可以在比赛开始之前选择是否将资源预先介绍到单个战场。这项预先承诺是公众知识。作为回应，对手可以通过与自己的部队相匹配，或者撤离来确保战场。在两个玩家的环境中，我们表明，较弱的球员从来没有动力将任何资源预先批准的任何资源前往战场，无论其价值如何。然后，我们考虑一个三人场景，其中两个玩家在不同的方面与一个普通对手作战。面对对手的两个球员中只有一位可以选择预先承诺。我们发现在某些情况下，该播放器从预先承诺中受益。分析表明，在不合作的团队设置下，没有可能建立联盟的可能性，可能会有激励措施公开向对手宣布战略意图。
In competitive adversarial environments, it is often advantageous to obfuscate one's strategies or capabilities. However, revealing one's strategic intentions may shift the dynamics of the competition in complex ways. Can it ever be advantageous to reveal strategic intentions to an opponent? In this paper, we consider three-stage Colonel Blotto games in which one player can choose whether or not to pre-commit resources to a single battlefield before play begins. This pre-commitment is public knowledge. In response, the opponent can either secure the battlefield by matching the pre-commitment with its own forces, or withdraw. In a two-player setting, we show that a weaker player never has an incentive to pre-commit any amount of resources to a battlefield regardless of how valuable it is. We then consider a three-player setting in which two players fight against a common adversary on separate fronts. Only one of the two players facing the adversary has the option of pre-committing. We find there are instances where this player benefits from pre-committing. The analysis indicates that under non-cooperative team settings and no possibility of forming alliances, there can be incentives to publicly announce one's strategic intentions to an adversary.
